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Abstract 
This paper explores the insights that theories of identity can offer for the conceptualisation 
and analysis of face. It argues that linguists will benefit from taking a multidisciplinary 
approach, and that by drawing on theory and research in other disciplines, especially in social 
psychology, they will gain a clearer and deeper understanding of face. The paper starts by 
examining selected theories of identity, focusing in particular on Simon‟s (2004) self-aspect 
model of identity and Brewer and Gardner‟s (1996) theory of levels of identity. Key features 
from these theories are then applied to the conceptualisation and analysis of face. With the 
help of authentic examples, the paper demonstrates how inclusion of these multiple 
perspectives can offer a richer and more comprehensive understanding of face and the 
frameworks needed for analysing it.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Discussions of face invariably refer to the concept of self. For example, Goffman (1967: 5) 
defines face with reference to „image of self‟, and Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) refer to it 
in terms of „public self-image‟. Ting-Toomey (1994: 3) argues that face is an „identity-
boundary issue‟, and Scollon and Scollon (1995: 34–36) discuss face in terms of the 
„interpersonal identity of individuals in communication‟ and the „self as a communicative 
identity‟. Debates have occurred on a range of issues, such as the extent to which face is an 
individual or relational phenomenon, whether it is a public or private phenomenon, and 
whether it is a situation-specific or context-independent phenomenon.  
A thread that runs through all of these concerns is the issue of identity. Surprisingly, 
however, there has been very little explicit consideration of the interrelationship between the 
two concepts. For example, to what extent are identity and face similar or different? How 
may theories of identity inform our understanding of face, and how may they aid our analyses 
of face? This paper takes up the challenge of exploring these questions. It focuses particularly 
(but not exclusively) on social psychological theories of identity, and maintains that these 
theories can offer very useful insights for both the conceptualisation and the analysis of face. 
Tracy (1990) touched on some of these issues many years ago, but there has been little 
follow-up discussion since then.  
 
2. Theories of Identity 
 
There are a number of different social psychological theories of identity and they reflect a 
variety of different approaches to the issue. Identity Theory (Stryker 1987) takes a 
sociological approach; Social Identity Theory (SIT) of Intergroup Relations (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization theory (SCT) (Turner et al. 1987) both take a 
psychological approach; and in North America, identity has traditionally been studied in 
terms of the social cognition of the self (e.g. Linville, 1985). (For an overview of these 
different approaches and theories, see Simon 2004.)  Recently, a number of researchers (e.g. 
Abrams and Hogg 1999) have sought to integrate the various perspectives, realising that to a 
large extent they reflect different levels of explanation rather than inherently contradictory 
conceptualisations. Simon‟s (2004) Self-Aspect Model of Identity is one such integrated 
approach, and this section is based to a large extent on his work. Work by self-presentation 
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theorists such as Schlenker (1980) and Leary (1996) is also relevant to the study of face, but 
for reasons of space, it is only dealt with in passing in this article. 
First, though, we need to ask what identity is. Simon (2004) starts his book by 
warning that identity may be an analytic fiction and that the search for its essence as a „thing‟ 
may be a misleading endeavour that diverts our efforts from a more promising process-
oriented course. Nevertheless, he maintains that if it is taken as a shorthand expression or 
placeholder for social psychological processes revolving around self-definition or self-
interpretation, including the variable but systematic instantiations thereof, the notion of 
identity will serve the function of a powerful conceptual tool. Campbell, Assanand and Di 
Paula (2000: 67) offer a useful definition of the self, which can be paraphrased as: 
 
“The self-concept is a multi-faceted, dynamic construal that contains beliefs about one‟s 
attributes as well as episodic and semantic memories about the self. It operates as a 
schema, controlling the processing of self-relevant information.” 
 
Simon‟s (2004) „Self-Aspect Model of Identity‟ proposes that a person‟s self-concept 
comprises beliefs about that person‟s own attributes or self-characteristics. These can be huge 
in number, and include elements such as: 
 Personality traits (e.g. shy) 
 Abilities (e.g. poor dancer) 
 Physical features (e.g. curly hair, slim) 
 Behavioural characteristics (e.g. usually gets up early) 
 Ideologies (Christian, democrat) 
 Social roles (e.g. project manager) 
 Language affiliation(s) (e.g. English, Chinese) 
 Group memberships (e.g. female, academic, Christian) 
People may differ in the degree to which they differentiate their various attributes (i.e. the 
number of different facets that an individual spontaneously uses in thinking about the self) 
and the degree to which they are integrated (i.e. the extent to which the various facets are 
interrelated). Nevertheless, they (consciously or sub-consciously) perceive and evaluate their 
self-aspects in a number of different ways, as shown in Table 1. 
 
<Insert Table 1 approximately here> 
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Valence refers to the degree of attraction or aversion that an individual feels towards a given 
self-aspect. For all of us, we evaluate certain aspects of ourselves positively, we dislike other 
aspects, and we are neutral about yet other aspects. Centrality refers to the extent to which a 
given self-aspect is crucial to, or defining of, our sense of who we are; some elements are 
core whilst others are more peripheral. Currency refers to time judgements regarding self-
aspects. We judge some attributes as applying to what we used to be like; we judge others as 
reflecting what we are currently like, and we anticipate that yet other attributes will apply to 
us in the future. Actuality refers to the distinction between ideal and actual characteristics. 
Some attributes reflect what we are like in reality; others reflect what we are striving to be 
like or what we think we ought to be like. 
 Psychological theories of identity typically distinguish between personal (individual) 
and social (group or collective) identities. Individual identity refers to self-definition as a 
unique individual, whereas collective identity refers to self-definition as a group member. 
Superficially it may seem that certain characteristics have more „collective potential‟ than 
others (e.g. a person‟s sex, ethnicity, religion etc.), but as Simon (2004) explains, in reality it 
depends how people experience a given self-aspect. For example, in many circumstances 
religious denomination may be just one feature of a person‟s individual identity, yet in other 
situations it may be the feature that construes his/her collective identity; similarly, a person‟s 
medical condition (e.g. a sufferer from heart disease or breast cancer) may be just one aspect 
of his/her individual identity, yet it may also be the basis of one of that person‟s collective 
identities (e.g. a breast cancer sufferer). 
 Brewer and Gardner (1996: 84) argue that three different levels of self-representation 
need to be distinguished: the individual level, the interpersonal level and the group level. At 
the individual level, there is the „personal self‟, which represents the differentiated, 
individuated concept of self; at the interpersonal level, there is the „relational self‟, which 
represents the self-concept derived from connections and role relationships with significant 
others; and at the group level, there is the „collective self‟, which represents the self-concept 
derived from significant group memberships. Hecht (1993, Hecht et al., 2005), who is a 
communication studies theorist, also distinguishes personal, relational and collective 
perspectives on identity. For example, he and his colleagues (Hecht et al. 2005: 263) explain 
the relational perspective on identity as follows: 
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“An individual identifies him- or herself through his or her relationships with others, 
such as marital partners, coworkers, and friends (e.g. I am a husband, accountant, 
friend). Social roles are particularly important in shaping this aspect of identity. [In 
addition] a relationship itself is a unit of identity. Thus, a couple as a unit, for instance, 
can establish an identity.” 
 
This threefold perspective, individual, relational and collective, is one that I build on later in 
the article. 
 Simon (2004) makes the very important point that all self-aspects, no matter whether 
they are construed in terms of individual, relational or collective identities, are both cognitive 
and social in nature. On the one hand, people form cognitive representations of who they are 
that are relatively stable and enduring. On the other, they also construct and negotiate their 
identities through social interaction. They not only enact elements of their personal, relational 
and collective selves through the process of social interaction, but they also negotiate and 
construct them, with the result that identities develop and emerge through interaction. This 
dual perspective, cognitive and interactional, is another important distinction that I develop in 
this article. 
 In relation to the interactional perspective, Schlenker and Pontari (2000) argue that 
people‟s self-presentation concerns (i.e. their concerns about the identity characteristics they 
wish to convey) can operate in foreground or background modes, but are never absent. Like 
computer anti-virus programs, they may run unobtrusively for much of the time, but the 
moment a problem arises, they capture the user‟s attention. This is a useful analogy for 
considering face. 
 What, then, are the functions of identity? Simon (2004: 66–67) identifies a number of 
functions, three of which are particularly pertinent for the study of face: 
 Identity helps to provide people with a sense of belonging (through their relational 
and collective self-aspects) and with a sense of distinctiveness (through their 
individual self-aspects). 
 Identity helps people „locate‟ themselves in their social worlds. By helping to define 
where they belong and where they do not belong in relation to others, it helps to 
anchor them in their social worlds, giving them a sense of „place‟. 
 The many facets of identity help provide people with self-respect and self-esteem. 
People‟s positive evaluations of their own self-aspects help build their self-esteem. 
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However, self-respect and self-esteem do not result simply from independent 
reflection; the respectful recognition of relevant others also plays a crucial role.  
These functions of identity suggest interconnections with the notion of face, so I turn to these 
in the next section. 
 
 
3. Face and Identity  
 
 
This section explores the similarities, differences and interconnections between the concepts 
of face and identity. 
 
3.1  Face, Identity and Social Interaction 
 
According to Goffman (1967: 7), face is something that is “diffusely located in the flow of 
events” of an interaction, and it becomes manifest only when people make appraisals of these 
events. Similarly, Lim (1994: 210) argues that this social element, which involves claims on 
the evaluations of others, is a defining feature of the phenomenon of face. 
 
“… face is not what one thinks of oneself, but what one thinks others should think of 
one‟s worth. Since the claim of face is about one‟s image held by others, one cannot 
claim face unilaterally without regard to the other‟s perspective. … The claim for 
face is the claim that the other should acknowledge, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
that one possesses the claimed virtues. … Face, in this sense, is different from such 
psychological concepts as self-esteem, self-concept, ego, and pride, which can be 
claimed without regard to the other‟s perspective.” 
 
 Several authors (e.g. Imahori and Cupach, 2005: 196; Arundale, 2005) have argued 
that it is this intrinsic social element that differentiates face from identity; for example, 
Arundale (2005) argues: 
 
“Face … is not equivalent with identity. Both relationships and identity arise and 
are sustained in communication, but a relationship, and hence face, is a dyadic 
phenomenon, whereas identity is an individual (and much broader) phenomenon.” 
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In other words, these authors seem to differentiate identity and face in terms of individuality 
versus relationship; in other words, they treat identity as situated within an individual and 
they treat face as a relational phenomenon. Certainly, face entails making claims about one‟s 
attributes that in turn entail the appraisal of others, so in this sense the notion of face cannot 
be divorced from social interaction. This is one way in which face differs from the notion of 
identity. However, as argued in the previous section, many social psychologists, as well as 
some communication studies theorists (e.g. Hecht, 1993; Hecht et al., 2005), would regard 
identity as incorporating not only individual construals of the self but also relational and 
collective construals. As I argue in section 4, this multi-level perspective on self-
representation can be usefully applied to the analysis of face in interaction.  
 
3.2 Identity, Face and Self-Attributes 
 
A second aspect of face that Goffman (1967: 5) mentions is the notion of social attributes: 
“Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes.” In this sense, 
Goffman‟s conceptualisation of face and the psychological conceptualisations of identity 
described in the previous section are very similar: they both entail claims to a range of 
attributes. Yet linguists have tended to overlook this point, perhaps because of the dominating 
influence of Brown and Levinson‟s (1978/1987) dual division of face into positive face and 
negative face. Tracy (1990: 215) argued many years ago that face theorists would do well to 
take more seriously the greater range of identity claims that social psychologists refer to and 
that challenge Brown and Levinson‟s framework, yet little attention has been paid to this 
since then. I follow up on this in section 4. 
 
3.3 Identity, Face, Valence and Affect 
 
Goffman (1967: 5), in his classic definition of face, points out that people only make face 
claims in relation to positively valued social attributes: 
 
“The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims 
for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.”  
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Face is not associated with negative attributes, except in so far as we claim NOT to possess 
them. In this respect, there is a clear distinction between face and identity. A person‟s identity 
attributes include negatively and neutrally evaluated characteristics, as well as positive ones, 
whilst the attributes associated with face are only positive ones.  
 Having said that, though, people may vary in how they evaluate a given attribute, and 
hence in the face claims they make. There is variation between people, and also variation 
across contexts. For example, many secondary school children in England feel they will lose 
face among their peers if they appear to be too clever and/or studious, because they value the 
attribute “cool” more highly than clever or hardworking. So in classroom contexts „clever‟ 
pupils often make face claims that they believe their peers will value positively; in more 
private teacher-student interactions, however, they may make face claims to competence, 
diligence, and so on.  
 This raises another point: face is associated with affective sensitivity. Goffman 
(1967), Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) and many other face theorists all agree that face is 
a vulnerable phenomenon, and hence associated with emotional reactions. Goffman (1967: 6) 
explains it as follows: 
 
“If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he 
probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face for him 
that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to „feel good‟; if his ordinary 
expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will „feel bad‟ or „feel hurt‟.” 
 
This description is very congruent with Schlenker and Pontari‟s (2000) claim that self-
presentation operates in foreground and background modes. When everything is going 
smoothly, we may barely be aware of our face sensitivities (they are operating in background 
mode), yet as soon as people appraise our face claims in an unexpected way (either positively 
or negatively) our attention is captured because we are affectively sensitive to those 
evaluations.  
The notion of affective sensitivity suggests another slight difference between face and 
identity (but not the narrower concept of self-presentation). Although we evaluate our 
identity attributes positively, negatively or neutrally (perhaps differently in different 
contexts), we are not necessarily affectively sensitive about them. If we are, then this 
suggests that we are simultaneously making face claims in relation to them.  
 
 10 
3.4 Identity and Face Reconsidered 
 
I propose that in cognitive terms, face and identity are similar in that both relate to the notion 
of „self‟-image (including individual, relational and collective construals of self), and both 
comprise multiple self-aspects or attributes. However, face is only associated with attributes 
that are affectively sensitive to the claimant. It is associated with positively-evaluated 
attributes that the claimant wants others to acknowledge (explicitly or implicitly), and with 
negatively-evaluated attributes that the claimant wants others NOT to ascribe to him/her.  
Furthermore, I propose that interactionally, face threat/loss/gain will only be 
perceived when there is a mismatch between an attribute claimed (or denied, in the case of 
negatively-evaluated traits) and an attribute perceived as being ascribed by others. Contrary 
to Goffman‟s claim that face is associated with „approved social attributes‟, I propose that the 
attributes that are affectively sensitive will vary dynamically in interaction, and will not 
always conform to the socially sanctioned ones (or non-sanctioned ones, in the case of 
negatively-evaluated traits). In fact, it is possible that people will choose to contest one or 
more approved attributes, and to claim other attributes that are more important to them in that 
particular context.  
 
 
4. Face in Interaction 
 
 
As I argued above, face entails claims on the evaluations of others, and so it needs to be 
analysed as an interactional phenomenon. In line with Arundale (2005), I use the term 
„interaction‟ in its „ordinary‟ sense to mean real-time verbal exchanges (i.e. not the conjoint, 
non-summative outcome of two or more factors or discoursal utterances). In this section, I 
explore face in interaction from three perspectives: (a) the multiple positive attributes that 
people may claim; (b) the types of analytic frames needed to analyse such claims, and (c) the 
dynamic, real-time unfolding of face claims and appraisals. 
 
4.1 Face and Attributes  
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In this section I present a number of examples that demonstrate the importance of considering 
the range of different attributes that can become face-sensitive in particular interactions. Let 
us start by considering an authentic example. 
 
Example 1:  
A British lady, in her early 50s, helped a young Hungarian student with weak English to 
find his way across London to catch the right train to Luton Airport. On reaching the 
train, the following interchange took place:  
Hungarian student: Thank you very much. You are a very kind old lady. 
British lady: No problem. I was catching this train anyway. 
Author‟s personal experience 
 
This interchange was one that I personally experienced. In Brown and Levinson‟s 
(1987: 102) terms, the Hungarian young man was addressing my positive face needs by 
“conveying X is admirable”. However, such a blanket analysis misses the complexity of face 
claims and appraisals that I experienced. Outwardly I responded to the young man‟s 
„compliment‟ with a routine type of reply, but inwardly I reacted with mixed emotions. I was 
pleased that he evaluated me as very kind, and this maintained or even boosted my face; on 
the other hand, I regard myself as „middle-aged‟ rather than „old‟, and so this threatened my 
face. In other words, this mixture of face-enhancement and face-threat resulted from the two 
different personal attributes (kindness and elderliness) that he ascribed to me, and from my 
evaluative judgements in relation to these qualities (positive valence for kindness, negative 
valence for elderliness). Of course, it is quite possible that for this Hungarian student, „old 
lady‟ had neutral or even positive connotations, and certainly he seemed completely unaware 
of any face-threat in his „compliment‟. But for me, „old lady‟ had negative connotations and I 
rejected its actuality, so the threat to my face lay in the mismatch between the attribute I was 
claiming (middle-aged) and the attribute he labelled me with (old).  
 Now let us consider a second authentic example. 
 
Example 2: 
A group of Chinese businessmen, at the end of a visit to a British company with which 
they had been doing business, got embroiled in a protracted argument with their British 
hosts over money. One of the Chinese became concerned about the impression they 
were conveying, and said privately to the others: One thing is that we should not let 
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people say we are stingy; secondly, we should not give the impression of being too 
weak; thirdly, we should negotiate in a friendly manner.    
Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 115 
 
In this example, the speaker identified three traits that were face sensitive: stingy, weak and 
friendly. He evaluated the first two traits negatively and the third one positively, and so he 
argued that he and his Chinese colleagues should maintain face, as a group, by avoiding the 
two negative attributions and by achieving the positive one. The potential threat to face in this 
example thus lies in the possible mismatch between the positively-valued attributes that the 
speaker was claiming (not stingy, not weak, friendly) and the negatively-valued attributes that 
he feared might be ascribed by others (stingy, weak, unfriendly).  
From these two examples, we can see that Brown and Levinson‟s (1978/1987) general 
distinction between positive and negative face is no help in unpacking the complex face 
claims that people make in real-life situations, and which others need to be sensitive to if they 
are to address people‟s face concerns in suitable ways.  
 
4.2 Face and Analytic Frames 
 
Building on Brewer and Gardner‟s (1996) three-level perspective on self-representation, I 
propose in this section that it can be useful to analyse face in this way.  
In Example 1, the most salient frame for analysis is an individual one, in that the face-
sensitive aspects concerned my individual, personal qualities. However, Example 2 illustrates 
the need for a collective frame, because the speaker was concerned about the face of the 
delegation. In other words, it was the face of the group rather than the face of each of the 
individuals that was primarily at stake. 
The next example illustrates the need for yet another analytic perspective. It involves 
the same group of Chinese businessmen as in Example 2. During their initial meeting with 
their British hosts, the British chairman gave them a welcome speech but failed to invite them 
to give a return speech (see Spencer-Oatey and Xing, 2004: 207). In a follow-up interview, 
the head of the Chinese delegation, Sun, commented as follows: 
 
Example 3: Interview Extract 
Sun: According to our home customs and protocol, speech is delivered on the basis of 
reciprocity. He has made his speech and I am expected to say something. … In fact, I 
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was reluctant to speak, and I had nothing to say. But I had to, to say a few words. Right 
for the occasion, right? But he had finished his speech, and he didn’t give me the 
opportunity, and they each introduced themselves, wasn’t this clearly implied that they 
do look down upon us Chinese. 
Note: Italics indicates English translation of the original Chinese 
 
This example illustrates the need for both relational and collective analytic frames. The 
relational element of face emerges in this example in two ways: the lack of reciprocity, and 
the perception of status difference in a context that entailed equality. In other words, 
relational attributes were at stake: the relative status of the business partners, and the rights 
and obligations associated with their relationship.  The collective element of face emerges 
through the phrase „us Chinese‟. The offence was taken as applying not to the delegation as 
individuals, but rather to them as Chinese nationals.  
Brown and Levinson‟s (1987) face model of politeness focuses on individual face 
sensitivities, and hence (in the terms of this paper) proposes an individual analytic frame. 
This, of course, is important. Nevertheless, as Examples 2 and 3 indicate, it is an incomplete 
analytic perspective; it needs to be supplemented by relational and collective perspectives. 
What, though, does the term „relational‟ refer to? Locher and Watts (2005: 10) define 
relational work as “the „work‟ individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others”. 
Arundale (2005) uses the term „relational‟ to index “the dyadic phenomena of relating as they 
emerge dynamically in person-to-person communication”. Holmes and Schnurr (2005: 124–
5), on the other hand, cite Fletcher‟s (1999: 84) concept of „relational practice‟: 
 
“Relational practice is a way of working that reflects a relational logic of effectiveness 
and requires a number of relational skills such as empathy, mutuality, reciprocity, and a 
sensitivity to emotional contexts.” 
 
Holmes and Schnurr maintain that in the workplace relational practice has three crucial 
components: it is oriented to the face needs of others, it serves to advance the primary 
objectives of the workplace, and its practices are regarded as dispensable, irrelevant or 
peripheral.  
My use of the term „relational‟ refers to the relationship between the participants (e.g. 
distance–closeness, equality–inequality, perceptions of role rights and obligations), and the 
ways in which this relationship is managed or negotiated. I thus take it to be narrower in 
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scope than rapport, which I define as (dis)harmony or smoothness–turbulence in 
relationships. Of course, rapport is partly dependent on relational (mis)management, but the 
latter is not the only factor that can influence it; for example, people‟s transactional „wants‟ 
and the ways they are handled can also affect the rapport between the interlocutors (Spencer-
Oatey 2005). My interpretation of rapport is thus close to Holmes and Schnurr‟s concept of 
„relational practice‟, but since this meaning is significantly different from that of „relational‟, 
as used by Locher and Watts (2005) and Arundale (2005),  I use the term „rapport‟ for the 
former and „relational‟ for the latter. 
 
4.3 The Dynamic Unfolding of Face Issues 
 
A third analytic focus of face in interaction is the real-time unfolding of face issues. This 
concerns not only the range of strategies (linguistic and non-linguistic) that are used by the 
participants to (mis)manage face, but also the dynamic unfolding of interactions. People‟s 
claims to face with regard to individual attributes, relational associations and collective 
affiliations, as well as their anticipations of the face claims that others may make in these 
regards, can all vary dynamically in an ongoing interaction.  
 Example 4 illustrates how identity positioning and face concerns can take unexpected 
turns. It is an extract from the Chinese–British business meeting that Example 3 comments 
upon. (See Spencer-Oatey and Xing, 2004, for details of the research procedure.) The 
meeting started with the chairman, Jack, focusing on the business relationship between the 
British and Chinese companies. He claimed the relationship was both an important one and a 
good one, and he explained that the purpose of the introductions was for them to get to know 
each other and learn about each other‟s interests. He expressed his company‟s hope that the 
delegation would have a useful, enjoyable and informative visit, and emphasised that all the 
British staff would do everything they could to meet the visitors‟ needs. He thus positioned 
his company and its staff as committed to the business relationship, and as interpersonally 
caring and considerate towards the delegation (i.e. both relational and collective analytic 
frames are needed for analysing his face claims).   
 Having made these introductory remarks, the Chairman asked the British staff and 
Chinese visitors to introduce themselves in turn. The British did so, but when he asked the 
Chinese to introduce themselves, there was an unexpected turn to the events. The delegation 
leader consulted his colleagues in Chinese as to what he should do, and the others asked him 
to introduce each of them of behalf of everybody. So after quite a noticeable pause, the 
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delegation leader started to give a return speech. At this point, however, the interpreter 
(speaking only in Chinese) interrupted him and insisted that he simply introduce himself, not 
give a speech. After some confusion as to what this entailed, he and the other delegation 
members all introduced themselves in turn. This can be seen in Example 4. 
 
Example 4:  (Welcome Meeting, just after the British participants have finished introducing 
themselves. Int = Interpreter)  
   
 Jack: could could I now ask if if the members (.) could each introduce themselves so 
that we can learn (.) um (.) who they are and what their interests are. 
 Int: [interprets into Chinese] 
 Sun: [turns to colleagues and discusses with them and the interpreter in Chinese] 
 Sun: we each introduce ourselves 
 Shen: it’s best if you do it on our behalf 
  10.14.06 
 Sun: [reading from a script] first of all, to [X] Company= 
 Int: =no no. he said first introduce yourselves (.) I am [surname] from [name] 
Company 
 Sun: I am [surname] from Company [name] 
 Int: [interprets into English] 
 Chen: say what you do 
 Sun: I’m involved in design 
 Xu: give your full name (.) full name (.) full name (.) say you’re a design engineer 
 Sun: design engineer 
 Int: [interprets into English]  
 Ma: I am the director of the [product] Department of Company [name] 
 Int: [interprets into English] [Chinese delegation members continue to introduce 
themselves.] 
Note: Italics indicates English translation of the original Chinese 
 
 The Chinese visitors were extremely offended by this, and in the post-event interview 
debated whether it was the interpreter‟s „fault‟ or whether the British were also to blame. 
They concluded that since the interpreter was working for the British, he must have known 
what they wanted and that this therefore must have been a deliberate attempt by the British to 
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claim their superiority. The Chinese visitors were thus extremely offended, and perceived a 
major threat to their face.  In fact, they were so insulted by the way in which the interaction 
spontaneously and dynamically developed (in combination with other misunderstandings) 
that they cancelled all the training sessions that had been arranged for them. (For more 
details, see Spencer-Oatey and Xing, 2003, 2004.) However, when the British chairman 
found out what had happened (in his post-event interview), he was appalled that the 
interpreter had interrupted, saying he would have been more than happy for them to give a 
return speech. He just did not want to put them under any pressure to do so.  
 Clearly, an interactional analysis such as this, that describes the dynamic unfolding of 
participants‟ various face claims and face-relevant interpretations, is useful and interesting. 
To what extent, though, is such an analysis sufficient? I suggest that analysing face only in 
interaction is comparable to studying just one side of a coin. I maintain that face, like 
identity, is both social (interactional) and cognitive in nature (Simon 2004; see section 2 
above). By this I mean that there are cognitive underpinnings that influence (but do not 
determine) how face unfolds in interaction, and that considering these will inform and enrich 
an interactional analysis. For instance, in relation to Example 4, it is important to know (as 
evidenced by their post-event comments) that the Chinese visitors were not used to 
introducing themselves and were expecting the delegation leader both to handle all the 
introductions and to give a return speech. Their acceptance of business meetings conventions, 
as well as their belief in hierarchical differentiation (cf. Pan, 2000) significantly influenced 
how they interpreted and reacted to the British chairman‟s behaviour. So it is to the cognitive 
underpinnings of face that I turn in the next section. 
 
 
5. Cognitive Underpinnings of Face 
 
 
Schlenker and Pontari (2000: 204), in their discussion of self-presentation, suggest that both 
values and expectations influence the self-images that people try to present to others. In this 
section we follow up on each of these cognitive underpinnings, arguing that each of them can 
affect people‟s face claims and face sensitivities.  
 
5.1 Face and Values 
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As I explained above, and in line with Goffman‟s (1967: 5) classic definition of face (cited in 
section 3.3 above), face is associated with value judgements. Might it be possible, therefore, 
to gain insights into the cognitive underpinnings of face by turning to work in social 
psychology on social values? This section explores this possibility. 
The social psychologist, Shalom Schwartz (e.g. Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al. 2001) 
has developed a universal framework of value constructs that has been empirically validated 
in over 63 different cultural groups. He asked people to rate the importance of a large number 
of different values (e.g. obedience, loyalty, honesty, success, freedom) as guiding principles 
in their lives, and then carried out a smallest space analysis on the ratings (a technique for 
representing intercorrelations in multidimensional space). He found that ten different value 
constructs emerged in the vast majority of countries/cultures, and that these values have a 
structured relationship (see Figure 1). Table 2 explains the meanings of the value constructs, 
and lists illustrative value items that are associated with each of them. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 approximately here> 
 
Schwartz‟s framework is potentially useful in two respects. Firstly, people‟s 
evaluative judgements of their own attributes (especially in terms of valence, centrality and 
actuality) could be influenced by the relative importance of their various personal value 
constructs. This in turn could influence which attributes are more face sensitive for them than 
others, and the degree to which they are face sensitive. Let us now reconsider some of the 
earlier examples. In Example 1, the Hungarian young man attributed two qualities to me (the 
British lady): kindness and age. Kindness is associated with the value construct 
„Benevolence‟, and this is a value that is very important to me ideologically, so this 
attribution was supportive of my face. However, what value is associated with the attribute 
„elderly‟? Different people may evaluate it differently, and there may also be cultural 
differences. For me, it is associated with diminishing attractiveness and failing faculties, and 
thus is negatively associated with value construct „Achievement‟. So to be labelled „old‟ was 
face-threatening to me. However, the young man gave the impression of expressing sincere 
gratitude through the compliment, and so maybe to him it was associated with status and 
hence with the value construct „Power‟. If that was the case, he would have assumed it to be 
supportive of my face.    
 In Example 2, the Chinese businessman identified three attributes that he felt they 
should display in their conflict negotiations with the British: that they should be friendly, not 
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stingy, and not weak. Friendliness and generosity (lack of stinginess) are both associated with 
the value construct „Benevolence‟; strength (lack of weakness) is associated with the value 
construct „Power‟. So if the businessmen are unable to maintain face in relation to all three 
attributes, the value construct that they hold less highly in this context („Power‟ or 
„Benevolence‟) will presumably influence which face claim(s) they will sacrifice. 
 Secondly, Schwartz‟s framework is useful for considering Brown and Levinson‟s 
(1978/1987) dual distinction between positive and negative face, and the associated debate 
regarding the cultural variation/universalism of this distinction. In Brown and Levinson‟s 
model, negative face refers to a person‟s want to be unimpeded by others, the desire to be 
free to act as s/he chooses and not be imposed upon; and positive face refers to a person‟s 
want to be appreciated and approved of by selected others, in terms of personality, desires, 
behaviour, values and so on. In other words, negative face represents a desire for autonomy, 
and positive face represents a desire for approval. Many people have challenged this dual 
conceptualisation, arguing that it is Western biased; for example, Matsumoto (1988) 
maintains that Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) have over-emphasised the notion of 
individual freedom and autonomy, and have ignored the interpersonal or social perspective 
on face. Schwartz‟s specification of values provides a useful conceptual framework for 
considering these arguments.  
The concerns that Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) label as negative face (viz. a 
person‟s want to be unimpeded by others, the desire to be free to act as s/he chooses and not 
be imposed upon) in fact are a reflection of the value construct „Self-direction‟, and could 
also include the value constructs of „Hedonism‟ and „Stimulation‟ insofar as they are self-
seeking. The concerns that Brown and Levinson label as positive face (viz. a person‟s want 
for his/her self-image to be appreciated and approved of by interactants), are potentially a 
reflection of all the other value constructs. Positive face is most frequently associated with 
qualities such as competence and status (linked with Schwartz‟s value constructs of 
„Achievement‟ and „Power‟), but as we have seen in earlier sections, people make face claims 
in relation to a wide range of attributes. For instance, Example 1 illustrates a face claim 
regarding kindness (linked with Schwartz‟s value constructs of „Benevolence‟), and on other 
occasions some people may wish, for example, to claim face around the attribute „obedient‟ 
or „devout‟ (linked respectively with Schwartz‟s value constructs of „Conformity‟ and 
„Tradition‟). 
Schwartz‟s framework can thus help unpack the range of values underlying the wide 
variety of attributes that people may be face sensitive to, and thereby offer partial reasons for 
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people‟s sensitivities. In addition, the greater proportion of potential „positive face values‟ to 
„negative face values‟ suggested by Schwartz‟s data, as well as the variation that occurs 
across societies in the relative importance that societies as a whole attach to the self-direction 
construct (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001), could explain why some linguists have argued that 
negative face is less important in their societies than Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) 
conceptualised it to be.  
 
5.2 Face and Sociality Rights–Obligations 
 
People‟s face claims and face sensitivities are not only based on their personally held values. 
Other factors can play a role too. In this section, I explore how they can be underpinned by 
people‟s conceptions of sociality rights–obligations. 
On a number of occasions, I have drawn a distinction between face and sociality 
rights–obligations and have argued that the two are conceptually distinct (e.g. Spencer-Oatey 
2000, 2002, 2005). However, in those same publications I have also pointed out that the two 
can be connected. Suppose, for example, a friend tries to force us to do something or ignores 
our request for help (infringing, respectively, our sense of personal entitlement to freedom 
and to association), we may simply feel irritated or annoyed. Sometimes, however, such 
treatment may go a step further and make us feel as though we have lost credibility or have 
been personally devalued in some way, and we feel a sense of face threat and/or loss. In this 
case, our face claims and face sensitivities are closely bound up with our sense of sociality 
rights and obligations.  
 As Spencer-Oatey (2005) explains, many behavioural conventions, rituals and norms 
develop prescriptive and proscriptive overtones. These then influence our expectations about 
behavioural responsibilities so that failure to fulfil these expectations may be perceived as a 
„negatively eventful‟ occurrence, and the result may be face threat and/or face loss. This is 
what happened in Examples 3 and 4. The Chinese visitors were expecting to be invited to 
give a return speech, and when they were not, they experienced this omission as face-
threatening. The key to understanding (and anticipating) such face threat/loss is to be aware 
of the participants‟ behavioural conventions and expectations associated with this kind of 
communicative activity.     
People‟s behavioural expectations, and the sociality rights–obligations associated with 
them, derive from a range of sources. In Examples 3 and 4, they derive from certain  
conventions of a given communicative activity (speech giving in international meetings). 
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Example 5 illustrates another source: people‟s conceptualisations of a given role relationship. 
(For other sources, see Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 98–100.) This example, which revolves round 
different interpretations of friendship, involves the same Chinese visitors described in 
Examples 3 and 4. 
 When the Chinese visitors arrived, the Sales Manager for China (Tim) was away on 
an overseas trip. Having experienced the „insults‟ described in Example 3 and 4 above (along 
with various other problems; see Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2004), the delegation members 
wanted to meet Tim as soon as possible. One of them (Mr Xu) had met Tim on one previous 
occasion in China and they thus believed that as a group they had a „personal‟ relationship 
with him. They knew when he was due to arrive back in England, and expected to meet him 
the following day. When there was no sign of him by lunchtime, they started repeatedly 
asking for his telephone number, and in a follow-up interview that evening, they commented 
as follows: 
 
Example 5: Interview Extract 
 Xu: Tim hasn’t shown up yet, right? He should have already come back yesterday. 
… 
 Shen: He should have been back yesterday, yesterday. Today today he didn’t show 
up. This morning he should have taken us out. We mentioned it to him [the 
interpreter]. … 
 Lin: Does Tim live in London? 
 Researcher: I don’t know where he lives. 
 Chen: In London. London is very close to here, isn’t it? … Thirty-odd miles, in fact 
very close. Your old friends from China are here, and as a matter of fact your 
major market, right? So on this occasion can’t you come and meet them? 
 Shen: And he knew that Mr Xu, senior engineer, was coming. 
Note: Italics indicates English translation of the original Chinese 
 
From the Chinese visitors‟ point of view, Tim had failed in his relational obligation, and this 
may well have been face threatening to them. They were claiming mutual friendship, but 
when Tim did not turn up, this claim was challenged.  From Tim‟s point of view, they were 
not his „friends‟, as he had only met one of them briefly in a business context; he had been 
away from his family for a long trip, and his first relational responsibility was towards his 
wife and children. He did not anticipate that his behaviour would be face-threatening to the 
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visitors, and when their reaction was explained to him in a post-event interview, he simply 
rejected their interpretation. 
 The key to understanding (and anticipating) the face threat/loss in this situation is to 
be aware of the participants‟ conceptions of what it means to „be a friend‟.  In other words, 
important insights into why people experience certain occurrences as face threatening can be 
gained by considering their underlying conceptions of sociality rights–obligations. Such 
considerations may also help us anticipate people‟s face sensitivities and thereby help us to 
manage them more effectively.       
 
 
6.  Two Outstanding Questions 
 
 
Finally, I briefly consider two outstanding questions: 
 To what extent is face always an interactional phenomenon? 
 What kind of data is needed for research into face? 
 In the paper so far, I have implied that face sensitivities emerge in interpersonal 
interaction, and especially in face-to-face contexts. Yet Ho (1994: 274) argues that the 
Chinese conception of face is not restricted to situational encounters: 
 
According to the Chinese conception, face may be defined in terms of the more 
enduring, publicly perceived attributes that function to locate a person‟s position in 
his/her social network. Thus defined, a person‟s face is largely consistent over time and 
across situations, unless there is a significant change in public perceptions of his/her 
conduct, performance, or social status. 
 
In line with that, I suggested in a previous paper (Spencer-Oatey 2005: 102) that we should 
distinguish between situation-specific face (which I labelled „identity face‟) and Ho‟s pan-
situational concept of face (which I labelled „respectability face‟). However, is there really 
such a clear distinction between the two? Suppose participants are not interacting face-to-
face, but asynchronously online in a discussion forum? Graham‟s paper in this volume 
indicates that face concerns are equally important in this interactional context. And what 
about newspaper reporting? Suppose a newspaper publishes a story that describes a particular 
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person in negative terms. Does that person lose face through this public dissemination of the 
information, even though the exact recipients of the information may be unknown personally 
and even unidentifiable? In many cultures, it would be argued that the person does lose face. 
If, therefore, we argue that face is always interactionally constituted, it will be necessary to 
interpret the concept „interaction‟ very broadly, so that it includes not only synchronous, 
face-to-face interaction, but also asynchronous communication and general public awareness.  
 A second question raised by this paper is the type of data that is needed for research 
into face. If face is something that people claim for themselves, and if face-threat or face-
enhancement occurs when there is a mismatch between an attribute claimed (or denied, in the 
case of negatively evaluated traits) and an attribute perceived as being ascribed by others, 
then to what extent is discourse data sufficient for research purposes? To what extent is it 
necessary to obtain people‟s evaluative reactions? Sometimes, of course, it is possible to 
access these reactions through subsequent discourse, or more subtly through vocalic quality 
and/or non-verbal behaviour (e.g. Locher and Watts, 2005; Culpeper, 2005). But in other 
cases, such signals are limited or missing, and I suggest that post-event comments can then be 
both important and enlightening (cf. Culpeper, 2005: 67). It could be argued, of course, that 
such post-event comments may be unreliable reconstructions, or may themselves be 
enactments of face with the researcher. Whilst this could be true, I nevertheless maintain that 
face issues are always subjective perceptions, and thus can never be judged in true/false 
terms. I believe that post-event comments can be useful for two reasons: they help identify 
people‟s face sensitivities and evaluative reactions, and they can provide insights into the 
cognitive underpinnings of their reactions. So for these reasons I contend that they are both a 
worthwhile and necessary type of data to collect. 
 
  
7.   Concluding Comments 
 
 
Face is a complex phenomenon that needs to be studied from multiple perspectives. Theories 
of identity suggest that face has a number of characteristics that need to be held in dialectic 
balance: 
 face is a multi-faceted phenomenon, yet it can also be a unitary concept 
 face has cognitive foundations and yet it is also socially constituted in interaction 
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 face „belongs‟ to individuals and to collectives, and yet it also applies to interpersonal 
relations 
Analyses of face thus need to take all of these elements into consideration. Authors 
who argue that face should be studied from a relational point of view (e.g. Arundale, 2005; 
Locher and Watts, 2005) are correct in emphasising the importance of this element. However, 
insights from identity theories demonstrate that an exclusive focus on this perspective will be 
too narrow. Multiple perspectives, which incorporate (and are not restricted to) the various 
elements included in this article, are all needed for a rich understanding. 
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Criteria Evaluative Judgements 
Valence  Negative                Neutral                 Positive 
Centrality Core                        Peripheral 
Currency Past                        Present                   Future 
Actuality Actual                              Ideal 
 
Table 1: Ways in which Self-Aspects can be Perceived & Evaluated 
 
 
<To be inserted on Page 4> 
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Figure 1: Schwartz‟s Value Constructs and their Structured Relationship  
(based on Schwartz 1992: 44) 
 
<To be inserted on page 17> 
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Value 
Construct 
Explanation Illustrative Component Values  
Power Social status and prestige, control or 
dominance over people and 
resources 
Social power, authority, wealth, 
preservation of public image 
Achievement Personal success through 
demonstrating competence 
according to social standards 
Success, competence, ambition 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
for oneself 
Pleasure, self-indulgence, 
enjoyment of life 
Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in 
life 
Variety, daring, excitement  
Self-
direction 
Independent thought and action-
choosing, creating, exploring 
Freedom, independent, curiosity, 
creativity   
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, 
tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature 
Equality, harmony, justice, care 
for the environment, 
broadmindedness   
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the 
welfare of people with whom one is 
in frequent personal contact 
Helpfulness, loyalty, 
responsibility, forgiveness, 
honesty 
 
Tradition Respect, commitment and 
acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that traditional culture or religion 
provide the self 
Humility, respect for tradition, 
devoutness 
 
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and 
impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social 
expectations or norms 
Obedience, self-discipline, proper 
behaviour, respect for elders 
 
Security Safety, harmony and stability of 
society, relationships, and of self 
Health and security for the family 
and the nation 
   
Table 2: Schwartz‟s Value Constructs and their associated Qualities  
(based on Schwartz and Bardi 2001: 270) 
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